Fundamentals

Introduction

Recently, Members of Parliament in Uganda were denied entry into a construction site of the Lubowa Specialized Hospital under the pretext that the Members of Parliament were visitors who did not have unfettered access to the construction site. This sparked debate across different platforms where the tax payers were struggling to understand why the MPs who play an oversight role for the government could not access a site of a public project. A number of key questions arose from this debacle: What informs the Contractor’s action of restricting visitors’ access to site? Does this affect a Contractor’s outlook towards Health and Safety protocols on the site?

In trying to understand why visitors do not have unfettered access to construction sites, we need to understand the Contractor’s liability as an occupier under Occupiers’ Liability.

Who is an occupier?

An occupier is defined in the case of Wheat v E. Lacon &Co. Ltd as a person who exercises an element of control over premises. This control includes physical control of premises and legal control of premises as was established in Harris v Birkenhead Corporation. Often, it’s the case that after the commencement order, the Employer hands over the site to the Contractor. This is exhibited, for instance, in Subclause 2.1 of the 1999 FIDIC forms of Contract. It is also a common feature in the JCT forms of contract where the Employer is required to give possession of the site to the Contractor on the Date of possession which is stated in the Contract particulars. In London Borough of Hounslow v Twickenham Garden Developments, it was held that th Contractor was entitled to such possession, occupation or use as was necessary to enable it to perform the contract. The Contractor will then have possession of the site from the date of possession until the date of completion.

Who, then is considered to be a visitor to premises?

A visitor to premises (site) is considered in three categories, namely:

• Those with express permission
• Those with implied permission: Implied permission is also subject to limitations which, if exceeded, render the person a trespasser. In Harvey v Plymouth City Council, it was held that any implied permission to enter must be exercised properly.
• Those with a right to enter: The law gives rights to entry to certain categories of people which render them within the definition of lawful visitors irrespective of the wishes of the occupier for instance police officers entering under warrant.

A duty of care is owed by an occupier to the three categories of persons stated above. Visitors to the site therefore are duly covered under the Occupiers’ Liability Principle. The occupier’s duty is to ensure that the visitor is not injured while on the premises. This can be particularly highlighted for road projects that run over a long distance and are used by different visitors at different times of the day and night. The Contractor has a duty of care towards visitors in the three stated categories. As such, there has been a general shift in Contractors’ mindsets towards Health and Safety Protocols as most contractors have adopted to use preventive measures that will ensure safety for all visitors of the site/ premise. The same applies for building projects.

Regarding the duty of care, although there is similarity with the standard of care in negligence, there is also an important distinction as an occupier is empowered by statute to determine the boundaries of his liability in section 2(1) Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 in England and Wales for instance. Generally, since the occupier controls the extent of the permission to enter, a visitor who acts in a manner contrary to that permission becomes a trespasser. The issue of the trespasser will be dealt with below.

Since children have access to sites sometimes and are largely considered to be less careful than adults, case law has sought to balance the responsibility between occupiers and parents as was seen in the case of Phipps v Rochester Corporation. Additionally, the level of care expected will depend upon the nature of the risk and the age and awareness of the child. In the case of Titchener v BRB it was held that no duty of care was owed to a 15-year-old boy who was struck by a train while walking on a railway line at night as he was aware of the dangers posed by his activity. A duty will exist if the land/premise holds concealed dangers or allurements that tempt children into danger as was seen in the case of Glasgow Corporation v Taylor.

Use of Warning Signs

Under the Occupiers’ Liability Principle, an occupier has a duty of care towards visitors and it may be satisfied if the occupier displays warning signs or cordons off areas that are dangerous. The following factors need to be taken into account when considering whether a warning sign was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe:

• A visitor should know what risk he is facing and therefore the warning has to be specific. As such, the Contractor could be liable where there is a deep excavation and he does not alert visitors to the site to it using a specific warning sign.
• Hidden dangers necessitate greater efforts to call attention to them than readily apparent risks for instance as in the case of Staples v West Dorset District Council in the UK where it was held that risks posed by wet algae on a high wall were so obvious that there was no need for a warning sign. The Ugandan case of Gakumba v Mandela National Stadium Ltd also highlighted the fact that the defendant was liable due to absence of warning signs and security lights where there was an uncovered manhole.
• Is the sign combined with other safety measures? The use of fencing or barriers emphasizes the need for safety.

Who is a trespasser on a site?

A trespasser is defined in the case of Robert Addie &Sons Ltd v Dumbreck as someone who goes in the premise without invitation of any sort and where presence is either unknown to the proprietor, of if known, is practically objected to. As such, it is true that in instances, a Contractor has limitations on who enters the premise(site). The key question then arises as to whether a Contractor bears liability on injuries to trespassers.

The approach taken by the courts to determining liability towards trespassers can be seen in Young v Kent County Council. The issues of liability of injuries caused to child trespassers was further explored by Court of Appeal in Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust. Keown makes an important distinction between injury caused by the danger caused by the state of the building and the dangerous use of perfectly well-maintained premises. This was also seen in Tomlinson v Congleton where it was held that injuries arising from the claimant’s dangerous use of otherwise safe premises will not give rise to liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Principle.

Conclusion

The contractor, as an occupier, has a duty of care to keep visitors under different categories safe while they use the site. This can have lasting effect on the Contractor’s Health and Safety protocols as a way of dealing with this liability. Contractors are therefore encouraged to develop robust Health and Safety Protocols in order to keep workers and visitors safe while they use the site premises. Additionally, visitors are encouraged to act within the ambits of the set protocols and warning signs while accessing a construction site given the high risk of injury on construction sites.

Following the outlook into common law on the appraisal of a Contractor’s tortious liability under the tort of negligence in the previous article which can be found here: https://blog.cg.co.ug/appraising-contractors-tortious-liability-under-the-tort-of-negligence/ ,it is important to contrast that with civil jurisdictions like France, Germany or Saudi Arabia among others.

How different would the Contractors tortious liability be under a civil jurisdiction?

In this article, while considering how the issue might have been differently addressed in a Civil Code Country, reference is made to the French Civil Code. The structure of French tort law is such that it does not spell out the different torts like negligence, trespass and nuisance but rather provides for them generally in Articles 1240 to 1245 of the Civil Code. There is no limitation on the type of wrong which may arise under these articles since they are drafted to be very wide.

Article 1245-8 provides that the claimant must demonstrate the harm, the defect and the causal relationship between the defect and the harm. These constitute the three elements of the claimant’s burden of proof in order to prove liability. Therefore, there is no need for a duty of care as would have been required by common law. Additionally, there is no need of application of the neighbour principle under French law. The claimant needs to prove the defect and the damages that he is pursuing. The French Civil code does not show how this link between defect and harm should be assessed but it must be direct causal link between the harm and the defect.

Based on this, using an example of an Employer on a building project that has suffered structural failure due to defects in construction and (or) design, the Employer could prove that the defect in the construction and (or)design of the Works caused failure of the structure and the Contractor would be liable under French law. Once the claimants (the Employers in this case) ably prove fault, damage and the causal link between the fault and the damage, they can win all their compensation.

Article 1241 provides that an individual is responsible for harm caused not only by their actions but also by their failure to act or exercise due care. This provision allows one to be liable for one’s omissions which is a departure from common law where in Stovin v Wise[1] it was held that the law does not recognize a duty of care owed to the whole world to take positive action to prevent harm. In Caparo v Dickman[2] terms, imposing such a general duty would be unfair, unjust or unreasonable. Referring to the instant facts, a Contractor would be liable to an Employer for actions that led to structural failure. Additionally, a Contractor would be liable to an Employer due to their inaction or lack of care in ensuring that the structure that was handed over was not under designed and improperly constructed.

Article 1242 provides that one is not only liable for the harm resulting from one’s actions but also for harm caused by the actions of those for whom they are responsible or by things under their care. From this, where a contractor has subcontractors on site, it can be considered that the Contractor is responsible for the Subcontractor’s actions. The Contractor would be open to multiple fronts of liability as a result depending on the different parties that are affected by the different subcontractor’s actions.

Article 1244 provides that a building owner, referred to as the Employer in this article, is liable for the harm caused by its collapse when that resulted from a lack of maintenance or construction defect. This indicates that liability arises from lack of maintenance or construction defects even when the owner of the building is not responsible for the cause of the defects. This is a departure from common law where a Contractor would instead be liable under public nuisance.

In conclusion, in addition to the liabilities of the respective parties already established under common law, French law imposes an additional liability to an Employer where the Employer would be liable to parties that suffer due to the defective building that it owns. The burden of proof required from the claimants differs from that under common law given that the claimants now must fulfil the burden of proof in Article 1245-8. Additionally, Contractors could be open to multiple fronts of liability due to actions of their subcontractors.

[1] [1996] AC 923 (HL).

[2] [1990] 2 A.C. 605.

Delay Analysis is a contentious issue in claims arising out of construction projects. Often time, there is an argument over the correct or more correct analysis method for delay analysis. The Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol (‘SCL Protocol’) sets out the following differing methods of delay analysis that can be used to analyze the impact of a delay event to the critical path of a construction program:

On 17 October 2022, the High Court handed down its decision in Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council [2022] EWHC 2598 (TCC), which related to the construction of a bus station in Blackburn.

The claimant, Thomas Barnes & Sons plc (in administration) (‘Thomas Barnes’) was the contractor employed by a local Council, with the project suffering significant costs increases and delay.  The Council purported to terminate Thomas Barnes’ contract and engage another contractor to complete the works.  Soon after, Thomas Barnes went into administration, with the administrators subsequently seeking approximately £1.7 million in damages.  This included an entitlement to prolongation and delay-related damages, which led the Judge to provide some discussion on the differing forms of expert delay analysis relied on by the parties.

In Thomas Barnes, the Judge noted that it would be wrong to place too much importance as to whether a particular method of delay analysis had been strictly followed, stating that:

‘The SCL Protocol itself discourages such an approach.  It states in the introduction that:

(a) its objective is to provide useful guidance.

(b) it is not intended to be a contract document nor to be a statement of the law;

(c) its aim is to be consistent with good practice rather than to be a benchmark of best practice; and

(d) its recommendations should be applied with common sense.  It states under paragraph 11.2 that “irrespective of which method of delay analysis is deployed, there is an overriding objective of ensuring that the conclusions derived from that analysis are sound from a commonsense perspective”.

Thus, it would be wrong to proceed on the basis that, because the SCL Protocol identifies six commonly used methods of delay analysis, an expert is only allowed to choose one such method and any deviation from that stated approach renders their opinion fundamentally unreliable.  It must be borne in mind that the common objective of each is to enable the assessment of the impact of any delay to practical completion caused by particular items on the critical path to completion.  However, I do accept that if an expert selects a method which is manifestly inappropriate for the particular case or deviates materially from the method which he has said he is following, without providing any, or any proper, explanation, that can be a material consideration in deciding how much weight to place on the opinions expressed by the expert.’

Especially when part of the claim centres around an extension of time, expert delay analysis is commonly relied on in both adjudication or litigation to prove or disprove a claim.  In light of the Judge’s comments in Thomas Barnes, it is not a requirement for a particular method to be strictly followed.  However, delay experts should be conscious of the impact that a deviation from the stated method used or the use of an inappropriate method will have on the weight of their evidence without a reasonable explanation

Other observations from Thomas Barnes

Traditional approaches to the main cause of delay have been the ‘dominant cause’ approach, focusing on the main cause of the delay, or alternatively, the ‘first in time’ approach, focusing on the event that occurs first. However, the Judge found that concurrent delays had occurred, even though there appeared to be a dominant delay, separate to one that occurred first. In this instance, the Judge made a finding that ‘depending upon the precise wording of the contract a contractor is probably entitled to an extension of time if the event relied upon was an effective cause of delay even if there was another concurrent cause of the same delay in respect of which the contractor was contractually responsible’. However, the Judge noted that despite being entitled to an extension of time for a dominant cause delay, the Contractor would not be entitled to costs for loss and expense where a separate concurrent delay occurred for which the contractor was contractually responsible.